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I. INTRODUCTION
On November 28, 1978, at the height of Argentina's "Dirty War," a young
married couple and their eight-month-old daughter disappeared in Buenos
Aires.' Jose Poblete, a Chilean national, and his Argentine wife, Gertrudis
Hlaczik, had been participating in a Christian Liberation group, and, along
with their baby, Claudia, were abducted by a group of officers working for the
Buenos Aires provincial police.2 The captors took the young family to a
detention camp where Poblete, who had lost both legs in an accident, and
Hlaczik, also disabled, were tortured before eventually being killed.' Two
survivors reported seeing Poblete's wheelchair "abandoned in a comer of [a]
parking lot."4 Twenty-two years later, activists found the couple's daughter
living with one of the retired police officials responsible for the kidnapping.'
After her identity was confirmed, Claudia Poblete returned to her maternal
grandmother.6
While horrific, experiences similar to those of the Poblete family have been
shared by thousands of Argentines who suffered through the human rights
abuses of the right-wing military dictatorship from 1976 to 1983.' Even
though the gross human rights abuses ended with the demise of the junta,8
victims have been forced to wait for justice as Argentina slowly comes to
terms with its past.
On the other end of the continent in January 2001, eighty members of rightwing paramilitary forces descended upon Chengue, a small village in the

l Nunca Mas, Report of CONADEP, Part II: The Victims (1984), availableat http://www.
nuncamas.org/english/library/nevagain/nevagain_213.htm. CONADEP, the National Commission
on the Disappearance of Persons, was created in 1984 by the government of President Raul
Alfonsin, the first president elected after the fall of the militaryjunta which ruled Argentina from
1976 to 1983. The Commission's goals extended only to uncovering the truth about what
happened to those who had disappeared, not establishing guilt.
2 Hector Tobar, Argentine Court Tosses Amnesty Laws, S.F. CHRON., June 15, 2005, atA3.
3Id.

4 Nunca Mas, supranote 1.
Tobar, supranote 2.
6 Id.
See generallyNunca Mas, supra note 1.
8 Argentina is one of many Latin American countries to have been ruled at one time by a
junta, a small group of military officers. Key figures in Argentina's junta included General Jorge
Rafael Videla, General Carlos Suarez Mason, and General Leopoldo Galtieri, who resigned after
Argentina's defeat in the Falkland Islands War. See David Weissbrodt & Maria Luisa
Bartolomei, The Effectiveness oflnternationalHumanRights Pressures:The Case ofArgentina,
1976-1983, 75 MINN. L. REV. 1009, 1031 (1991).
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mountains of Colombia.9 As opposed to the organs of the Argentine state
twenty-five years earlier, the Colombian paramilitaries were not searching for
alleged subversives. They had simply come to destroy the town. By the end
of the night, members of the Autodefensas Unidas de Colombia (Self-Defense
Forces of Colombia) had executed all twenty-three of the town's men with
clubs made for breaking stones, and then set the town on fire. I" Four years
later, only seven families of the original 120 had returned to the ruins and
desolation, and those responsible, reacting to a law passed by Colombia's
Congress in 2005," surrendered their arms to await a maximum of eight years
incarceration. 12 However, due to the shortcomings of the law, it remains
unlikely that any of the perpetrators will actually serve time for the atrocities
committed at Chengue.' 3
While Colombia and Argentina have reached different stages in their
struggles against human rights violations, and their general political situations
are by no means identical, the two countries share one similarity. The public
in both states deserves a legal solution to abuses from state actors, whether the
now-removed Argentine junta of the late 1970s and early 1980s, or the stillexisting, quasi-state-supported paramilitary groups of Colombia. However, the
states seem to be moving in different directions concerning victims' rights and
bringing human rights offenders to justice. 4 While Colombia's new
legislation seems to advance the goal of avoiding prosecution while leaving the
public without answers, the decision of Argentina's highest court opens the
gates for the prosecution of culpable military officers and other personnel. 5
The Colombian law effectively grants amnesties by allowing former
paramilitary members to receive minimal criminal sentences for crimes for

9 The Law of the Fraud,SEMANA (Colom.), Aug. 21, 2005, available at http://www.cipo
nline.org/colombia/blog/archives/000 141 .htm.
10Id.
" Ley de Justiciay Paz. Law No. 975, July 25, 2005, [45.980] Diario Oficial [hereinafter
Justice and PeaceLaw], available at http://cne.presidencia.gov.co/leyes/2005/ulio/ley97525
0705.pdf.
12

Id.

" The Law of the Fraud,supra note 9.
14 CompareJustice andPeaceLaw, supranote 11, with Corte Suprema de
Justicia [CSJN],
6/14/2005, "Simon, Julio Hector y otros s/ privaci6n ilegitima de la libertad, etc.," S. 1767
(XXXVIII) (Arg.), availableathttp://www.derechos.org/nizkor/arg/doc/nulidad.html [hereinafter
Hector Simon] (striking down Argentina's amnesty laws).
"5See HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, SMOKE AND MIRRORS: COLOMBIA'S DEMOBIUZATION OF
PARAMILITARYGROUPS (2005), availableat http://hrw.org/reports/2005/colombia0805/; Tobar,
supra note 2.
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which they "accept" responsibility, while the Argentine Supreme Court, in the
case of Julio Hector Simon, struck down that country's amnesty laws. 6
Certainly, this discrepancy reflects Argentina's progress in the last decade,
progress necessary in order to come to terms with the past.'7 However, as long
as Colombia's insurgency lingers, the Justice and Peace Law will most likely
not be successful in healing the wounds caused by years of human rights
abuses.
This Note discusses the progress (or lack thereof) recently made in
Colombia and Argentina regarding both countries' histories of struggles with
human rights abuses and the investigation and punishment of those responsible
for these crimes. Following this introduction, Part II provides an overview of
recent actions taken by the legislature of Colombia and the Supreme Court of
Argentina regarding amnesty or pseudo-amnesty legislation. Part II.A
discusses Colombia's Justice and Peace Law,'" passed in 2005 and reviled as
little more than amnesty legislation by many within and without the country.
Part Il.B addresses the effects of the Colombian legislation through summer
2006. Part IV describes Argentina's amnesty laws and the atmosphere
surrounding their passage in the early 1980s. Part V introduces the relevance
of the Inter-American Court to the discussion of South American amnesty
laws, while Part VI addresses the constitutional basis of Argentina's Supreme
Court decision. Part VII discusses the 2005 Argentine Supreme Court decision
which declared unconstitutional that nation's express amnesty legislation.'
Special attention will be paid to the case that made the Argentine Court's
ruling possible, the Inter-American Court decision in the case of BarriosAltos,
a case in which Peru's amnesty laws, very similar to those of Argentina, were
ruled without legal effect.20 Finally, the analysis focuses on the current and
possible future repercussions of Colombia's and Argentina's legislative and
judicial decisions, concluding that Argentina has laid the groundwork for a
complete consolidation of democracy by basing the unconstitutionality of its
prior amnesty laws on the principles of international human rights
jurisprudence. On the other hand, Colombia will continue to experience unrest

16

See Justiceand Peace Law, supra note 11; Hector Simon, supra note 14.

'" Raquel Aldana, Steps Closer to Justicefor Past Crimes in Argentina and Chile: A Story
of Judicial Boldness, Nov. 17, 2004, http://www.law.case.edu/war-crimes-research-portaU
instant analysis.asp?id= 12.
IS Justice and PeaceLaw, supra note 11.
19 Hector Simon, supra note 14.
20 Barrios Altos Case, 2001 Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 8, at para. 44 (Mar. 14, 2001)
[hereinafter BarriosAltos], availableat http://www.worldlii.org/int/cases/IACHR/2001/5.html.
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and further human rights abuses, as its recent pseudo-amnesty legislation runs
directly contrary to international human rights principles.
II. BACKGROUND: PSEUDO-AMNESTY V. A BREAK WITH THE PAST
On June 21, 2005, the Congress of Colombia passed the Justice and Peace
Law, a long-awaited and controversial piece of legislation, which President
Alvaro Uribe approved the following month.21 With the goal of facilitating the
peace process and reincorporating members of armed groups into civil life, the
law provides incentives to domestic terrorists and human rights violators who
committed such abuses as members of Colombia's extralegal paramilitary
organizations in the form of relatively light sentences, in return for
demobilization and a promise not to return to prior lawless behavior.2 2 In the
wake of more than a half century of insurgencies and counterinsurgencies in
the country, the government sought to reach a compromise among the ruling
elites, the guerrilla leaders, and the victims of human rights abuses on the
domestic level. 23 On an international level, Uribe's conservative government
intended to demonstrate a combination of strength to end the conflict and a
willingness to set a precedent for conflict resolution in South America and
elsewhere. 24 However, criticism from human rights organizations both in
Colombia and overseas had reached deafening proportions. 25 These
organizations see Colombia's administration as simply granting a new form of
amnesty to human rights violators.26 In an age of Latin American democracies
squarely facing their international obligations, Colombia appears to be
acquiescing to terrorists and taking a major step backward through the
promulgation of such legislation.27
In contrast, in the same month, Argentina's Supreme Court struck down its
own amnesty laws passed almost twenty years earlier by the first

2 See Justice and PeaceLaw, supra note 11.

24

Id. arts. 1, 17, 29.
Colombia: Between Peaceand Justice, ECONOMIST, July 3, 2005.
Id.

25

See ADAM ISACSON, CTR. FOR INT'L POL'Y, INTERNATIONAL POLICY REPORT, PEACE OR

22
23

"PARAMILITARIZATION?" (2005), availableat http://ciponline.org/colombia/0507ipr.htm; Press

Release, Amnesty International, Colombia: The Justice and Peace Law Will Benefit Human
Rights Abusers (Sept. 12, 2005), available at http://www.amnestyusa.org/countries/colombia/
document.do?id=ENGAMR230302005.
26 See HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, supra note 15.
27

Id.
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democratically elected government after the fall of the military junta that ruled
from 1976 to 1983.28 The culmination of a long chain of events, including
various federal courts ruling the laws unconstitutional and Congress'
annulment and invalidation of the legislation, the 2005 Supreme Court
decision will likely be characterized in the future as one of the final steps in
Argentina's transition to a democracy in substance as well as form.
Specifically, the Court found unconstitutional the "Punto Final" (Full Stop law
of 1986) and "Obediencia Debida" laws (Due Obedience law of 1987).29 The
latter spared all military personnel except commanders from prosecution, while
the former set a sixty-day deadline from the law's enactment for commencing
prosecutions for human rights offenses during Argentina's military
dictatorship.3" The Supreme Court's decision has been praised by international
organizations such as the International Commission of Jurists as a step toward
justice for Argentina's victims.3"
Il. COLOMBIA'S JUSTICE AND PEACE LAW
A. An Overview of the Legislation
Since the passage of the law by Colombia's Congress, debate has raged
regarding its possible application and effects.32 In May 2006, challenges to the
legislation even reached the country's Constitutional Court, which upheld the
law's constitutionality by a 6-3 majority. 33 Under the terms of the statute, a
paramilitary member who confesses to crimes and agrees to renounce his
membership in an "armed group organized outside the boundaries of the law"

28 Hector Simon, supra note 14.
29 Law No. 23492, Dec. 24, 1986, [XLIV-A] A.D.L.A. 1100 [hereinafter Punto Finallaw];

Law No. 23521, June 8, 1987, [XLIV-A] A.L.J.A. 260 [hereinafter ObedienciaDebida law].
30 Id.
31 Press Release, International Commission of Jurists, Argentina: International Jurists
Applaud Ruling Against Impunity Laws (June 17, 2005), availableat http://www.icj.org/news.
php3?id-article=37098-larg=en.
32 See ISACSON, supra note 25; HuMAN RIGHTS WATCH, supra note 15.
33 However, the Court struck down some of the most troubling provisions, and the three
dissenting magistrates were in favor of invalidating the entire law. Human Rights Watch, Court
Fixes Flaws in Demobilization Law (May 19, 2006), availableat http://hrw.org/english/docs/
2006/05/19/colomb 13430_txt.htm. This Note will mention the differences between the original
provisions of the law and the changes made by the Constitutional court during the course of the
discussion.
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may receive preferential treatment.34 On the one hand, proponents of the
legislation stress the possible benefits.35 Presumably, the law provides the
former paramilitary member with an incentive to confess since the government
retains the right to prosecute him or her under previous law for crimes to which
he does not admit guilt or if he retracts his "free declaration. 3 6 In addition, the
legislation does not apply to crimes committed before joining a paramilitary
organization, thereby eliminating the possibility of a beneficiary's claim of ex
post facto membership solely for the purpose of taking advantage of the law.37
Furthermore, the law sets out the provision that the sentence may be served
abroad, theoretically maintaining the possibility of extradition to the United
States or another country in which the accused may be sought.38 Finally, the
law provides the framework for demobilization, disarmament, the
identification of ex-terrorists, their renunciation of past terrorist acts, and even
future job training to reincorporate human rights violators into society.3 9
However, anyone who benefits from the law's preferential treatment and then
returns to terrorism theoretically will be subject to harsher criminal penalties
already on the books.4 °
On the other hand, human rights organizations remain skeptical about any
trace ofjustice or peace that might arise from the legislation.4 The possibility
of human rights violators exposing their financial supporters leaves the
country's elites in a precarious position, and the influence of the wealthy may
have contributed to the defeat of a tougher approach favored by a powerful

" Demobilized combatants who accept the charges brought by the state prosecutor and
comply with all further requirements will receive a maximum sentence of between five and eight
years. Justice and Peace Law, supra note 11, art. 29.
" Carolina Barco, Colombia Minister of Foreign Affairs, Address at the Woodrow Wilson
International Center (July 20, 2005), http://www.wilsoncenter.org/events/docs/Barco%20
remarks%2007-20-05.doc.
36 Justice and Peace Law, supra note 11, art. 19, para. 1.
37Id. art. 2. Upon the original passage of the law, however, this was debatable. While the
law provides its benefits only to those who committed their crimes during membership in a
paramilitary group, prosecutors originally would have had to prove the date of entry into the
group within the sixty-day window for investigation provided in the legislation, which would
certainly have proved to be a daunting task. HuMAN RIGHTS WATCH, supranote 15, at 57 n. 152.
After the Constitutional Court's May 2006 ruling, investigators now have more time to perform
their duties. See Human Rights Watch, supra note 33. How much time, however, still remains
unclear.
38 Justiceand Peace Law, supranote 11, art. 30.
39 Id. arts. 1-8.
40 Id. art. 25.
41 ISACSON, supra note 25; HuMAN RGHTS WATCH, supra note 15.
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senator.4 2 Questions also remain as to whether the law will leave the
paramilitary command and support networks in place.43 Furthermore, doubt
exists as to whether those who confess and subsequently face criminal
punishment will actually serve any hard time." The law requires confinement
in a "secure and austere establishment," not necessarily a prison.45 Moreover,
political crimes are not extraditable under Colombian law, so attorneys for the
ex-paramilitary members will certainly argue that funding their political cause
necessitated involvement in the drug trade, making the crime political and
therefore not extraditable.46 Most important, for many the legislation leaves
an impression that while both the government and the paramilitaries will reap
the advantages of a general amnesty, the victims gain little.47
While promising justice and satisfaction, the Justice and Peace Law
originally allowed prosecutors remarkably little time to make their cases and
remains nebulous about how scarce resources will be channeled to victims of
human rights abuses.48 After the demobilized member's free declaration
42 Senator Rafael Pardo, formerly minister of defense, introduced a bill calling for five to ten
years in prison for beneficiaries and requiring an exit interview revealing all crimes in which they
were involved, illegally obtained assets, and names of commanders and financial supporters.
The final version of the law required none of this until the Constitutional Court's ruling. The
Court ruled that the Law implicitly required full disclosure of the truth in order to reap the
benefits of the legislation. ISACSON, supranote 25; Human Rights Watch, supra note 33.
" In fact, the law only requires that the demobilizer "deliver information or collaborate with
the dismantling of the group" as a requirement for eligibility for the lighter sentence. HUMAN
RIGHTS WATCH, supra note 15, at 59, 60 (quoting Justice and Peace, art. 11). The original text
of the legislation does not provide a penalty for perjury (since the statement is not taken under
oath) or for lying about the group's operations. Id. However, the May 2006 decision of the
Constitutional Court mandates that offenders tell the truth during their interrogation, since
demobilizers will lose the benefits of the law should they later be found to have lied or omitted
details oftheir crimes. Indira A.R. Lakshmanan, Ruling ThreatensPeaceforColombia,BOSTON
GLOBE, May 20, 2006.
" Assuming a maximum eight-year penalty for criminal charges that the paramilitary
member accepts and the addition of a 20% increase for charges brought and accepted after the
initial sentencing, the longest term of incarceration would be nine and one-half years. Justice
and Peace Law, supra note 11, arts. 20, 25. This incarceration would only take place if the
defendant offered a full confession or if the prosecution already had uncovered solid evidence,
situations which are unlikely to occur. See HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, supra note 15, at 53.
" Justiceand Peace Law, supra note 11, art. 30.
46 ISACSON, supra note 25.
Id.
48 Colombian authorities seem to be relying on applying existing asset forfeiture laws to
47

provide reparations, but this will only be effective if prosecutors know what assets are available
to be forfeited. Since 2002, the government has only secured the forfeiture of approximately 200
paramilitary assets. See HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, supra note 15, at 60 n. 165. However, the May
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(version libre) of his past crimes, prosecutors would have had only thirty-six
hours to decide whether to initiate a sixty-day investigation period.49 This time
frame would have allowed for little more than the verification of matters to
which the accused had already confessed. At the end of these two months, an
expedited trial begins at which victims may testify, but Colombia faces a
challenge in convincing victims to overcome their fear of the state apparatus
in order to appear at a trial.5" While the law provides for witness protection to
assuage such trepidation, no one knows from where the funds will be drawn
in order to guarantee witness safety.5'
The government expects the public to accept reparations and
demobilization rather than long prison sentences for those responsible for
human rights violations.5 2 Those who accept the charges brought against them
face a maximum eight-year sentence for their crimes, regardless of the
heinousness of the offense, without the possibility of cumulative sentences,
which are not possible under Colombian law.53 In other words, an exparamilitary member responsible for massacring an entire village could still
possibly receive a sentence of as little as five years in a secure and austere
country hacienda. 4
While the law guarantees the right to complete reparations including
psychological assistance and a public apology,5 the government rests its hopes
on funding victims' material recourse from foreign donations and the ex-

2006 ruling of the Constitutional Court paves the way for offenders to be forced to pay
reparations out of their own pockets, not just from illegally acquired assets. See Human Rights
Watch, supranote 33.
" Originally, investigators would have had only thirty-six hours to decide whether to press
charges. Justice and Peace Law, supra note 11, arts. 17-18. The Constitutional Court struck
down this particular provision in its May 2006 ruling, but the exact amount of time prosecutors
will have for investigations remains uncertain. Human Rights Watch, supra note 33.
'0 The Law of the Fraud,supra note 9.
"I Justiceand PeaceLaw, supranote 11, arts. 38-39.
52 See id. arts. 19-21.
" Id. art. 20. Originally, paramilitaries would have also received credit for time served while
leaders negotiated with the government, but the Constitutional Court disallowed this provision.
Human Rights Watch, supra note 33.
14 HuMAN RIGHTS WATCH, supra note 15. Congress determined that violators
should be
held in facilities that "meet the conditions of security and austerity typical of the centers run by
the National Penitentiary and Prison Institute." Justiceand PeaceLaw, supranote 11, art. 30.
However, paramilitary leaders more often tend to negotiate with the government while being
"held" in the demilitarized zone of Santa Fe de Ralito. See ISACSON, supra note 25.
" Justice and Peace Law, supra note 11, arts. 42-48.
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paramilitary members' forfeited assets.5 6 This may be wishful thinking. Those
who demobilize are unlikely to possess anything of value under their own
name, and the law provides neither penalties for hiding property nor funds for
detecting money laundering operations.57 At the same time, skepticism from
the international community, including even the United States, a typically
dependable ally, has been expected to complicate the collection of earmarked
aid from abroad.58 In fact, the U.S. Congress' approval of $483.5 million
through the Andean Counterdrug Initiative and an additional $250 million in
military aid for Colombia in 2006 would leave the Uribe Administration
somewhat nonplused. 9 The U.S. Congress approved only $20 million (the
cost of one and one half Black Hawk helicopters) to aid demobilization, far
below the $80 million desired by Colombia.60 In addition, Congress imposed
stricter conditions on the aid money, including requirements of State
Department certification that the demobilizers have renounced any affiliation
with their paramilitary groups, a more complete confession than required by
the Colombian legislation, and a prohibition on use of the money until the
State Department certifies that Colombia is cooperating with extradition of
drug lords facing trial in the United States.6

56 A more likely scenario would be the continued use of these ill-gotten assets by exparamilitary members attempting to muscle their way into local politics. See Colombia:Between
Peace and Justice, supra note 23.
17 See HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, supranote 15. In fact, one commentator denigrates the Law
itself as "no more than a vast money-laundering operation." Carlos M. Gutidrrez, Colombia's
Death Squads Get Respectable, LE MONDE DIPLOMATIQUE, Oct. 2005, available at http://
mondediplo.com/2005/10/12colombia.
5 Although a"secret legal opinion" from the U.S. Justice Department apparently allows the
United States to provide funds for the demobilization, at least one prominent member of
Congress expressed serious doubts concerning the law's effectiveness. Legal Opinion Paves
Way for U.S. to Support Colombia Demobilization, LATIN AMERICA ADVISOR (Inter-American
Dialogue, Washington, D.C.), Aug. 10, 2005, at 2, available at http://www.maxwell.syr.edu/
inside/LAA050810.pdf. Senate Foreign Affairs Committee Chairman Richard Lugar sent letters
to President Uribe asking the president to take into account concerns about the punishment of
human rights offenders. Id. at 3.
" Adam Isacson, The 2006 Foreign Aid Outcome, PLAN COLOMBIA AND BEYOND, Nov. 9,
2005, available at http://www.ciponline.org/colombia/blog/archives/000171.htm (speculating
from 2005 as to future import).
60 Id.
6' Latin America Working Group, Good News, Bad News: Congress Votes to Finalize2006
Appropriations,Nov. 14. 2005, http://www.lawg.org/countries/colombia/2006appropriations.
htm (last visited Sept. 24, 2006).
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A sense of unfairness marks the law as well. Ironically, the ex-guerrillas
will receivejob training intended to re-incorporate them into society.62 On the
other hand, although the legislation created a Reparations Commission for
victims, this new body remained in limbo with no regulations promulgated by
the government for six months, and victims, whose homes and livelihoods have
often been destroyed, receive no such aid.63 For these reasons, and judging
from more recent events, the skepticism of human rights organizations and
Colombia's allies appears to be at least partially justified.'
B. The Effect of the Justiceand PeaceLaw
65
"A conflict with 30 years of roots doesn't end with a decree."

Demobilization and reintegration, the two foundations of the Justice and
Peace Law, have yet to be achieved at any significant level.66 While some
paramilitary members have kept their promises to demobilize, the Law has not
provided a foundation strong enough to withstand the lack of political
willpower exhibited by the state in advancing the demobilization process.6 7
Due to an easily foreseeable lack of funds and organization, the jobs and other
assistance promised to those who surrender their arms have simply not
materialized.6 8 Months after two thousand members of a paramilitary group
turned in their weapons at a televised ceremony in August 2005, the vast
majority remained unemployed with little hope of finding stable employment
that would enable them to distance themselves from their former lives.69 A
former guerrilla commented to the local media that the "reinsertion process is
out of control."70 In the past three years, eleven thousand demobilizations have
taken place with the same number expected to surrender their weapons in
62 The Law of the Fraud,supra note 9.
63

Justice and Peace Law, supra note 11, arts. 49-55.

64

See ISACSON, supra note 25; HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, supra note 15.

65 Colombia: One and a Half Steps Forward,One Back, ECONOMIST, Jan. 7, 2006, at 5.
66

See HUMAN RIGHTS

WATCH,

supra note 15 (discussing the failures of demobilization);

Carlos Salgado, Reinsertados tienen ideas pero no empleo, EL COLOMBIANO, July 13, 2006
(investigating the lack of employment for those who have chosen to demobilize and return to
Colombia's Cordoba region).
67 Adam Isacson, The Demobilization "Time Bomb, "Oct. 29, 2005, http://www.ciponline.
org/colombia/blog/archives/0001 68.htm.
68 Id.
69 Id.
70 Id.
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2006.71 Combined with an estimated eight thousand deserters, nearly thirty
thousand young people, many with little education or training in any field other
than warfare, now face the prospect of reinsertion into society by underfunded
and sometimes incompetent state actors.7 2 It takes little imagination to foresee,
rather than reinsertion into society, a plunge into the abyss of crime, whether
organized or common. As a cautionary tale, one need only glance back to the
turmoil in El Salvador, which arguably became even more violent after the end
of its civil war in 1992, owing to the state's failure to reinsert combatants into
society, and the resulting spiral into gang violence.73 As a result, the
Colombian media has characterized the current situation as a "time bomb"
waiting to explode.74
Much of the problem stems from the generic definition of the word
"victim" in the law itself. Anyone from the recipient of a machete attack to the
spouse of a displaced farmer is covered under the law as a "victim," leading
with modest resources can possibly compensate
to questions of how a country
75
claim.
a
with
everyone
The Colombian government's lack of a substantive, workable plan to
compensate the paramilitaries' victims has been matched by its inattention to
procedure. In addition to a lack of a fully developed reinsertion plan,
Colombia's Congress also erred by failing to promulgate regulations regarding
enforcement of the Justice and Peace Law until the end of 2005.76 While the
law remained unchanged, the agencies charged with the execution of the
legislation were left in limbo for six months awaiting direction from Congress,
and prosecutors were largely unable to take action.7 7

71

Id.

72 Id.

Furthermore, in January 2006, 1 out of every 100 demobilizers was already dead due

to a lack of protection or a quick return to violent crime. Colombia: One and a HalfSteps
Forward,One Back, supra note 65. As of the first week of January 2006, only 460 of the exparamilitaries had been given jobs, 123 had been killed, and authorities had arrested 223 for the
commission of common crimes. Id.
"3Bomba de Tiempo, SEMANA, Sept. 17, 2005.
74 Id.
71 Justice and PeaceLaw, supra note 11, art. 5. Awards of up to $6 million per family in
cases decided by the Inter-American Court in the late 1980s lead one to believe that Colombia
cannot possibly afford to compensate all of its victims fully. See Bomba de Tiempo, supranote
73.
76 GobiernoReglamento la Ley de Justiciay Paz, EL TIEMPO, Jan. 2, 2006.
77 Colombia: One and a HalfSteps Forward,One Back, supra note 65.
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These and other failures fostered continuing criticism from international
groups such as the United Nations.78 Taking a cue from other human rights
groups, the Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights offered its
critique of the Law, stating that it "has not succeeded in establishing the legal
framework for the dismantling of illegal groups, the reintegration into society
of their members and the respect for the truth, justice and reparation of the
victims."79 Unfortunately, when compared to thejudicial revolution underway
in Argentina, these words certainly ring true.
IV. ARGENTINA'S AMNESTY LAWS

Continuing its recovery from the human rights abuses of the junta that ruled
from 1976 to 1983 and the economic collapse at the turn of the twenty-first
century, Argentina has chosen a path very different from that of Colombia. °
During the time of Argentina's military dictatorship, the Supreme Court
repeatedly requested clarification of the status of hundreds of missing
individuals.8 ' The Court consolidated four hundred writs of habeas corpus into
one such request, but the ruling junta denied any knowledge ofthe individuals'
disappearances.82 Soon after the Falklands disaster and during its final days
in power, the junta passed the Law of National Pacification, amnesty
legislation that immunized every member of the military from prosecution. 3
Although the Argentine Criminal Code requires courts to apply the law more
beneficially to the defendant in the case of a change of law after the criminal

" Oficina de Naciones UnidasInsiste en Criticasa Ley que da Beneficio a Paramilitares,
EL TIEMPO, Jan. 5, 2006.
79

Id.

While this divergence may involve such issues as political culture, geography, and wealth,
recent differences may be tied to the belief that while Argentina is on the verge of consolidating
its democracy, Colombia is still finding its way. CompareHector E. Schamis, Argentina:Crisis
andDemocraticConsolidation,13 J. DEMOCRACY 81 (2002) (discussing Argentina's economic
crisis and its effect on consolidation), with Ana Maria Bejarano & Eduardo Pizarro Leong6mez,
80

From "Restricted" to "Besieged": The Changing Nature of the Limits to Democracy in
Colombia(Notre Dame Kellogg Inst., Working PaperNo. 296), availableathttp://www.nd.edu/
-kellogg/workingpapersfWPS/296.pdf(arguing that Colombia remains a "semi-democracy" in

a state of erosion).
" Enrique Dahl & Alejandro M. Garro, Introductory Note, Argentina: National Appeals
Court (CriminalDivision) Judgmenton Human Rights Violations by FormerMilitaryLeaders,
26 I.L.M. 317, 318 (1987).
82 Id. The right of a prisoner to go before ajudge to determine whether he has been detained

according to due process (habeas corpus) is not set forth in the Argentine Constitution.
83 Law No. 22924, Sept. 22, 1983, [XLIV-A] A.L.J.A. 1681.
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act," the succeeding government of President Raul Alfonsin mustered
arguments against the constitutionality of the National Pacification law,
resulting in the law's nullification in 1983.85 Subsequent legislation nullified
the amnesty law, opening the door for the prosecution of the junta's human
rights violators, and nine officers were arrested almost immediately
thereafter.8 6 However, the military resisted in the name of national
reconciliation, and the newly elected government's caution toward offending
the military resulted in the passage of two laws which would haunt Argentina
for two decades.87
Three years after the demise of the military junta, Argentina's Congress
passed the "Punto Final" law, which extinguished, by means of a sixty-day
statute of limitations, criminal proceedings for crimes "related to the
establishment of violent methods of political actions."88 If suspects were not
summoned within the allotted time period to submit statements, prosecution
could not go forward. 9 Facing great pressure from army commanders,
President Alfonsin justified the passage of this law as an attempt to
reincorporate the military back into public life in a break with the past.9" Since
the truncated time period allowed little leeway for the gathering of evidence,
few thought any offenders would be prosecuted. 9' However, to the surprise of
all observers, courts remained in session over the 1986-1987 summer vacation
(December-February in the Southern Hemisphere), and the Federal Court of
Appeals seized jurisdiction over cases pending before the Supreme Court of
84 COD. PEN.

art. 2 (Arg.).

First, the government argued that the precarious validity of statutes passed by the junta
may be outweighed by the law's offensive content. Second, the National Pacification statute
violated Article 29 of the Constitution, which prohibits the concentration of all governmental
power in one branch. Finally, the law violated Article 16, the equal protection clause. Dahl &
Garro, supra note 81, at 319. Alfonsin's work was perhaps made possible by the fact that four
hundred leaders of the previous regime had been imprisoned at this time. Id.
86 Law No. 23040, Dec. 27, 1983, [XLIV-B] A.L.J.A. 1813.
87See Punto Finallaw, supra note 29; ObedienciaDebida law, supra note 29.
8'

88 According to Article 1,

The crime shall be extinguished with respect to any person whose alleged
involvement in any degree... whose summons has not been ordered to give
a signed statement by a court having jurisdiction over the subject matter, prior
to sixty calendar days counted as from the date of promulgation of this law.
Punto Finallaw, supra note 29.
89 The law contained no such tolerance of some offenses frequently committed by state actors
during this time, including the crimes of kidnapping of minors and rape. Id.art. 5.
90 Dahl & Garro, supra note 81, at 328.
9'Id. at 329.
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the Armed Forces.92 As a result, eight different appeals courts had issued 150
summonses by the last week of February 1987. 9"
However, after the passage of the Punto Final law, Argentine military
leaders again rose up and pressured President Alfonsin to stop the ongoing
trials against the armed forces. 94 The President's personal negotiations with
the officers had little positive effect, and eventually Alfonsin's successor,
Carlos Menem, issued pardons for selected officers who had been convicted
and then pardoned the rest of the military after December 1990. 9' Responding
to further threats from the military, Congress followed with the passage of the
Obediencia Debida law in March 1987.96 This legislation created the
presumption that military officers of low and medium rank merely followed
orders in any actions that possibly violated human rights. 97 Argentine law
requires freedom to act in order to be found guilty of a crime, and in these
cases, such officers would be presumed to have been coerced by those issuing
92 Id.
93 Id.

9'Presentation of Christina M. Cerna, Principal Specialist of OAS Secretariat for IAHCR,
Domestic Effect of U.N. Human Rights Treaties in the Americas, Presentation at the Meeting of
the Impact of the Work of the U.N. Human Rights Treaty Bodies on National Courts (Sept. 26,
2003), http://www.abo.fL/instut/imr/research/seminars/ILA/Cema.doc.
9'Luis Marquez Urtubey, Non-applicabilityofStatutes ofLimitationfor Crimes Committed
in Argentina: BarriosAltos, 11 Sw. J.L. & TRADE AM. 109, 111 (2005). Menem's pardons'
status as the last vestige of legal acquiescence to the rule of the junta may soon come to an end.
As of September 2006, the great majority of these pardons still stand, but current President
Nestor Kirchner has begun to support their repeal, a stance which, if it translates into further
judicial action, would perhaps overcome the final hurdle in Argentina's journey to democratic
consolidation. El Gobierno opina que ahora "hay que llegar mas lejos, " LA NACION, Sept. 5,
2006. Kirchner's government supported the September 4, 2006 decisions of federal judge
Norberto Oyarbide, who ruled that the pardons were precluded since those charged had
committed crimes against humanity which are not pardonable. La Justicia declaro nulo el
indulto a Martinez deHoz, LANACION, Sept. 5,2006. Among those affected by the initial ruling
(which will almost certainly be appealed) is former junta leader Jorge Rafael Videla, who
currently remains under house arrest. If upheld on appeal, the invalidation of his pardon will
result in Videla again facing trial for the 1976 kidnapping of two businessmen. La Justicia
tambien anulo el indulto a Videla, LA NACION, Sept. 5, 2006.
96 ObedienciaDebida law, supra note 29.
97 Id. Article 1 of the ObedienciaDebida law states that
It is presumed without admitting any conflicting evidence that those who at
the time the acts were committed were chief officers, subordinates and
troops - are not subject to punishment for the crimes committed, since they
have acted in obedience of orders. In such cases it will be considered by
operation of law that the above-mentioned individuals have acted under
coercion.
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orders.9" The Supreme Court confirmed the validity of both laws in the Camps
decision of 1987, reasoning that Congress has the power to promulgate
criminal codes; 99 therefore, Congress should possess the ability either to
declare certain acts non-criminal or abolish punishment for their
commission."°°
The tables started to turn in the 1990s as families of the "desaparecidos,"
those who vanished in state custody during the rule of the junta, asserted their
right to know the truth about what really happened to their family members. 0 '
At the same time, Congress amended the Constitution in order to give treaty
law precedence over domestic law, setting the framework for the compulsory
application of international law. 2 Most important, federal courts began to
reconsider the validity of the amnesty laws.'0 3 In 2001, both the Punto Final
and Obediencia Debida laws were declared invalid on the grounds that they
functioned as amnesties, which Congress had no right to grant."" This
decision started a trend of federal courts refusing to apply statutes of
limitations, amnesties, or pardons to crimes committed during the
dictatorship. 5 Actions previously barred by the Punto Final law were
reopened, including the Camps case, and actions against medium-rank officers
previously exempted by the Obediencia Debida law saw the light of day as
well.'0 6

9 See Urtubey, supra note 95, at 112.
9 Corte Suprema de Justicia [CSJN], 22/6/1987, "Ramon Juan Alberto Camps y otros,"
Fallos (1987-310-1162) (Arg.).
"0Urtubey, supra note 95, at 112.
10 Id. at 113.
102

CONST. ARG.

art. 75, availableat http://pdba.georgetown.edu/Constitutions/Argentina/

argen94_e.html.
103Urtubey, supra note 95, at 119.
'0o"Congress... may not grant acts of submission or supremacy whereby the life, honor, or
wealth of the Argentine people will be at the mercy of governments or any person whatsoever."
CONST. ARG. art. 29.

"' Federal Judge Gabriel Cavallo of the Federal Court of Appeal in Criminal and
Correctional Matters of Buenos Aires first ruled the amnesty laws unconstitutional inNovember
2001, setting off a chain reaction in other federal courts, with the 2005 case of Julio Hector
Simon being the culmination of judicial efforts in this regard. Juzgado Federal [Juzg. Fed.],
9/11/2001, "Simon, Julio / procesamiento," (Arg.) [hereinafter Julio Simon], availableat http://
www.nuncamas.org/juicios/argentin/sala2_091101_1 .htm.
' See, e.g., Corte Suprema de Justicia [CSJN], 21/8/2003, "Jorge Rafael Videla," La Ley

[L.L.] 87 (2003) (Arg.); Corte Suprema de Justicia [CSJN], "Camps," Fallos (1987-310-1162)
(Arg.).
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V. THE INTER-AMERICAN COURT AND BARRIOS ALTOS

The Argentine Supreme Court based much of its decision to hold the
amnesty laws unconstitutional on the reasoning of the Barrios Altos case
decided by the Inter-American Court of Human Rights. 1°7 This case dealt with
the state-sponsored execution of fifteen individuals suspected of being
subversives in Lima, Peru in 1991.1°8 Peruvian authorities refused to begin an
investigation into the case until 1995. Even at that time, investigators
encountered a lack of cooperation from the military, followed by the passage
of amnesty laws by the regime of President Alberto Fuj imori in response to the
investigation.' 0 9 The first such law exonerated any member of the army,
police, or even civilians who had violated human rights at any time between
1980 and 1995."0 The law was adopted by the Fujimori government
immediately without public notification, discussion, or comment."' In other
words, the Peruvian military and security forces were granted blanket amnesty
from being accused, investigated, prosecuted, or convicted for a human rights
violation, and those who had been convicted saw those convictions annulled."12
When a judge declined to apply the amnesty law on the basis of its violation
of international obligations, the Fujimori government threatened the judicial
branch with prosecution for the refusal to apply the law.' ' Shortly thereafter,
a second amnesty law made judicial compliance with the government's
legislation a matter of law."'
The Inter-American Commission on Human Rights already had called on
Peru to reopen an investigation into the facts of the case, grant reparations for
material and moral damage to the victims or their next of kin, annul the
amnesty laws, and to pay the victims' litigation costs.' '5 After attempting to
withdraw from the Court's jurisdiction, which the Court rejected as failure to
comply with Article 68 of the Convention and a violation of the principle of

'07 BarriosAltos, supra note 20.
108Id.
109Id. para. 2(i).
11

Law No. 26479 (June 15, 1995) (Peru).

.. BarriosAltos, supranote 20, para. 2(i).
1' Id. para. 20).
...Id. para. 2(k).
114 Law No. 26492 (July 3, 1995) (Peru). "Application of amnesty is obligatory." This
effectively closed any judicial debate on the matter, and a judicial decision from a Fujimorifriendly court followed, finding the laws constitutional.
..
5 BarriosAltos, supra note 20, para. 1.
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pacta sunt servanda, Peru admitted responsibility for violation of Articles 4,
5, 8, and 25 of the Convention on Human Rights and agreed to discuss
reparations with the victims and their next of kin." 6 Furthermore, the Court
reasoned that it considers all amnesty laws inadmissible, characterizing them
as mechanisms for the prevention of the investigation of human rights
violations and punishment of those responsible." 7 Finally, it held that Peru's
laws are "incompatible with the Convention on Human Rights and ...lack
legal effect." 8 Using this reasoning, Argentina's Supreme Court, having been
bound by such international norms in 1994, struck down the amnesty laws by
a 7-1 margin in June 2005."9
Argentina, like Peru, ratified the American Convention and accepted the
jurisdiction of the Inter-American Court on Human Rights; however, by 1990,
no one had been punished for human rights violations. 2 ° Empowered by the
establishment of "truth commissions," complaints to the Commission from
victims' next of kin ensued regarding the invalidity of President Menem's
pardons and the amnesty laws under the Convention. 121 Argentine nongovernmental organizations pressed the issue in these trials, which were
limited to the investigation and documentation of human rights violations
without the possibility of prosecution or punishment. 21 2 The Lapaco case, in
particular, triggered dialogue between human rights groups and the national
courts.123 Finally, in 2001, Judge Cavallo of the Buenos Aires Federal Court
of Appeals ruled the Punto Final and Obediencia Debida laws unconstitutional
116 Id. para. 51. Article 4 guarantees every person's right to life; Article 5 concerns a person's
right to humane treatment; Article 8 guarantees the right to a fair trial; and Article 25 provides
the right to judicial protection. American Convention on Human Rights, July 18, 1978, 1144
U.N.T.S. 123.
117 BarriosAltos, supra note 20, para. 43.
"18

Id. para. 51.

Hector Simon, supra note 14. Congress amended the Constitution in 1994, providing
constitutional rank to various human rights agreements. CONST. ARG. arts. 29, 75, 522. In 1996,
the Supreme Court held Inter-American Court decisions to be binding on Argentine Courts.
Corte Suprema de Justicia [CSJN], 12/9/1996, "Bramajo, Hernan J.," Fallos (1996-319-1840)
"9

(Arg.).
120

2'

Cerna, supra note 94.
See id. Complaints to the Inter-American Commission invoked violations of Argentines'

rights to judicial protection and a fair trial. Id.
122 See Nunca Mas, supra note 1.
123 Carmen Aguiar de Lapaco v. Argentina, Case 12.059, Inter-Am. C.H.R., Report No.
70/99, OEA/Ser.L/V/II.106, doc. 3 rev. at 161 (1999). As a result of this case, filed with the
Inter-American Court, Argentina agreed to adopt legislation allowing criminal courts to have
exclusive jurisdiction over all cases concerning the "desaparecidos."
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on account of their violation of both the American Convention on Human
Rights and the United Nations Convention Against Torture. 24 As a result, the
case of Julio Hector Simon was reopened.'25 Simon, nicknamed "Julian the
Turk," plied his trade as part of a "work group" sanctioned by the military to
kidnap and "disappear" alleged subversives. 126 This case was appealed to the
Supreme Court, and in August 2002, Attorney General Nicolas Becerra
recommended that the amnesty laws be declared unconstitutional. 27 After the
June 2005 final Supreme Court ruling, new charges for possibly three hundred
defendants may result,2 finally providing the victims of the junta the
opportunity for justice.1 1
VI. THE 2005 ARGENTINE SUPREME COURT DECISION-THE
CONSTITUTIONAL BASIS

In June 2005, Argentina's Supreme Court decided one of the most
important cases in the country's history. The appellant, Julio Hector Simon,
relied on the country's amnesty laws and the running of the statute of
limitations to spare him from criminal punishment as a consequence of his
kidnap and torture of the Poblete family. 29 The Court, however, in upholding
an appeals court decision, 30 ruled otherwise, focusing on: Argentina's direct
application of international law in domestic matters; the lack of an effective
statute of limitations in crimes against humanity; the finding that forced
disappearance itself is a crime against humanity; and, finally, on the basis of
the Inter-American Court's ruling in Barrios Altos.' 3' The Court not only
upheld the sentence against Simon, but also declared both the Obediencia
Debida and Punto Final laws unconstitutional and null and void and affirmed
32
the constitutionality of Law 25.779, which annulled both amnesty laws. 1

124

Julio Simon, supra note 105.

126

Id.
Cema, supra note 94.

127

Opinion of the Attorney General in Opposition to the Laws of Obediencia Debida and

125

Punto Finalin the Case ofJulio HectorSimon, Aug. 29,2002 (referenced in Julio Simon, supra
note 105). See id.

Tobar, supra note 2.
Julio Simon, supra note 105.
130 Hector Simon, supra note 14.
131 Id.
132 Id.
128
129
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Regarding the application of international law to Argentina's domestic
legislation, the Constitution allows international norms to be applied directly
33
without being incorporated through legislative action on the domestic level.
Furthermore, the Constitution explicitly recognizes the American Convention
on Human Rights as one of the treaties at the summit of the "constitutional
hierarchy."'' 34 Argentinejurisprudence clearly states that human rights treaties,
such as the Inter-American Treaty, are directly incorporated into domestic
law. ' Therefore, one can view the BarriosAltos decision as a precedent for
Argentine courts upon the decision of the Inter-American Court.
Concerning the concept of the inapplicability of crimes against humanity
to statutes of limitation, as a signatory of United Nations General Assembly
Resolution 23 of 1968, Argentina agreed to investigate such crimes and bring
offenders to justice. 36 Congress approved this agreement in 1995,
memorializing Argentina's obligation to adopt the means to prosecute such
criminals.' 37 In effect, the state would no longer have any power to renounce
or hinder the criminal prosecution of any crime against humanity committed
on Argentine soil. 38 As a result, in Hector Simon, the Court found that a
statute of limitations protecting those committing crimes against humanity acts
merely as a "security clause" for the evasion of mechanisms adopted by
international law and therefore must not be allowed to have a legal effect in
such cases.'39

3 According to Article 31 of the Constitution,
This Constitution, the laws of the Nation enacted by Congress in pursuance
thereof, and treaties with foreign powers, are the supreme law of the Nation;
and the authorities of each province are bound thereby, notwithstanding any
provision to the contrary included in the provincial laws or constitutions,
except for the province of Buenos Aires, the treaties ratified after the Pact of
November 11, 1859.
CONST. ARG. art. 31. This is known as a monist approach, through which treaties become the
law of the land. Other states maintain a dualist approach, through which an aggrieved party
would have to look to the implementing legislation of the treaty in domestic law, rather than the
treaty itself.
134 CONST. ARG. art. 75, sec. 22.
' HectorSimon, supra note 14, para. 17 (opinion of Justice Lorenzetti).
136 Convention on the Non-Applicability of Statutory Limitations to War Crimes and Crimes
Against Humanity, G.A. Res. 2391 (XXIII), U.N. Doc. A/7218 (Nov. 26, 1968), availableat
http://www.un.org/documents/ga/res/23/ares23.htm.
'31 Law No. 24584, Nov. 29, 1995, availableat http://conhist.org/ARG%20Leyes/Ley/202
4.584%20de%201995.htm.
13 Hector Simon, supra note 14, para. 14 ("Sentencia" opinion of Justice Petracchi).
'39 Id. para. 92 (opinion of Justice Maqueda).
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The Court rejected the argument that forced disappearance does not reach
the level of a crime against humanity; therefore, the kidnappings undertaken
during the dictatorship would be covered as well. 4 Affirming that "the
systematic practice of the forced disappearance of persons constitutes a crime
against humanity,"'' the Supreme Court reaffirmed its commitment to
bringing to justice those responsible for offenses against Argentine citizens
during the dictatorship. 4 2
VII. BARRIOS ALTOS AND JULIo HECTOR SIMON

The Inter-American Court's decision in BarriosAltos answered any doubts
about the duty of the Argentine state in relation to its amnesty laws.'4 3 When
the Court ruled Peru's amnesty laws null and void as violations of the InterAmerican Convention, it followed logically that Argentina's similar legislation
would also be prohibited as a contravention of the international law of human
rights.'" First, the Commission recommended to Argentina the adoption of
measures necessary to shed light on human rights violations which occurred
during the dictatorship. "' Next, Argentine courts caught up with the trend in
Latin American jurisprudence toward accepting international tribunal
decisions.' 46
The legislatures of Peru and Argentina did not pass their respective amnesty
laws under equivalent circumstances and the details of the cases can be
distinguished from each other, with the decision in Barrios Altos clearly
understood as a judicial guideline.'
In general the cases remain very
48
similar. The Argentine legislation "present[s] the same vices which led the

4' Id. para. 31 (opinion of Justice Highton de Nolasco) (citing Corte Suprema de Justicia
[CSJN], 24/8/2004, "Arancibia Clavel, Enrique Lautaro s/homicidio y asociaci6n ilicita/recurso
de hecho -causa n'259," (2004) (Arg.)), available at http://www.nuncamas.org/juicios/corte/
arancibia_24ago04.htm.
141 Inter-American Convention on Forced Disappearance of Persons, adopted June 9, 1994,
33 I.L.M. 1429.
142HectorSimon, supra note 14, para. 31 (opinion of Justice Highton de Nolasco).
143 Id. para. 23 ("Sentencia" opinion of Justice Petracchi).
144Id.
145 Id. para.

20 ("Sentencia" opinion of Justice Petracchi).
See BarriosAltos, supranote 20.
141 Id. para. 24.
148 However, one justice dissented on this point. In the opinion of Justice Fayt, BarriosAltos
remains distinguishable from Hector Simon since the Peruvian laws more closely resembled
Argentina's National Pacification Law, which was rejected by Congress in 1983. Law No.
146
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court to reject the Peruvian laws," and both sets of laws were written to avoid
prosecuting those responsible for serious violations of human rights.'4 9 In
other words, BarriosAltos imposes strict limits on Congress's power to grant
amnesty by simply not allowing acts such as those covered by Argentina's
legislation. 5 ' While the concurrence in the Inter-American Court case
recognized that under certain circumstances selective amnesty may help reestablish peace, states may not pardon the most severe violations of human
rights, those which signify contempt for human dignity.' 5' Barrios Altos,
according to the majority of the Argentine Court, cannot be seen as an isolated
precedent, but rather as a milestone in a line of consistent jurisprudence
holding that the "promulgation of a law manifestly contrary to obligations
assumed by the state party to the Convention constitutes perse a violation of
[the Convention] and generates international responsibility for the state. ' 52
Furthermore, a mere finding of unconstitutionality will not suffice. Such
legislation must be repealed in order to remove the possibility of the defendant
invoking the more lenient criminal law or the principle of resjudicata.'3 In
other words, the amnesty laws were declared to have no legal effect, with
subsequent legislation repealing both the Punto Final and Obediencia Debida
laws. Congress took the first step toward voiding the laws with legislation in
2003,' and the Supreme Court affirmed the validity of that law in the instant
case.' In finding constitutional the law nullifying the amnesty legislation, the
Supreme Court opined that the revocation constituted a first step in amending
156
Argentina's past infractions of international law.
There is no doubt that Argentina is bound to follow the jurisprudence of
BarriosAltos, obliging states to assist victims and their families by ensuring
effective resources to the investigation and punishment ofthose responsible for

22924, Sept. 22, 1983, [XLIV-A] A.L.J.A. 1681. Justice Fayt went on to distinguish the cases
by mentioning that, unlike the Argentine amnesty legislation, the Peruvian laws were neither
announced publicly nor debated in the legislature. Furthermore, the Punto Final and Obediencia
Debida laws, in his opinion, never hampered the arrest and trials of those not exonerated by the
laws specifically, with the arrest of 400 individuals affiliated with the military in 1989 offered
as proof. Hector Simon, supra note 14, paras. 78-81 (opinion of Justice Fayt).
149 Hector Simon, supra note 14, para. 24 (opinion of Justice Petracchi).
,5o Id. para. 26.
'I'
ld.para. 27, citing BarriosAltos, supra note 20 (concurrence of Garcia Ramirez).
.52Id. para. 29, citing BarriosAltos, supra note 20.
...Id. para. 28.
154 Law No. 25779, Sept. 3, 2003, B.O. 30.226.
...Hector Simon, supra note 14.
56 Id. para. 29 (opinion of Justice Highton de Nolasco).
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human rights violations and denying any validity of amnesty laws.' Congress
was never authorized in the first place to pass such laws and in doing so
violated both constitutional principles and international human rights treaties,
implicitly sanctioning a policy of impunity for state actors under the
dictatorship. ' The amnesty laws violated the principle of equality before the
law since they prevented victims and their successors in interest from attaining
justice against the perpetrators of human rights abuses. 59
VIII. ANALYSIS
Clearly, Argentina and Colombia are moving in different directions in their
attempts to come to terms with their legacies of human rights abuse. On its
face, it appears that Colombia's Justice and Peace Law violates Articles 4, 5,
8, and 25 of the Inter-American Convention, while the decision of Argentina's
Supreme Court following the ruling in the Barrios Altos case successfully
removes Argentina from the list of countries allowing or tolerating such
violations. While the Justice and Peace Law does not specifically mention the
word "amnesty" and theoretically sets penalties for human rights violators,
these penalties will fail to serve as an effective deterrent to the paramilitaries.
Furthermore, the Colombian state apparatus, depending on foreign donations
and forfeited assets, lacks the resources to enforce the law, therefore allowing
the paramilitaries to operate with virtual impunity. This is tantamount to the
formalized state protection extended to the Argentine military throughout the
1980s and 1990s until the present. 6 '
The situations facing Argentina during the "Dirty War" and Colombia
during its travails can be distinguished to some extent due to the fact that
Argentines faced repression from state actors, while Colombian paramilitaries
have always operated, at least ostensibly, outside the realm of state security.
However, the two countries have both faced a lack of political will to prosecute
human rights abusers coupled with legislation enabling the state to shield
offenders from investigation, trial, or punishment. 6 ' The decision taken
72 (opinion of Justice Maqueda) (citing BarriosAltos, supra note 20).
Id. para. 18 (opinion of Justice Highton de Nolasco).

157 Id. para.
158

9 Id. para. 19.

160 This amnesty occurred as a result of the
161 Justice and Peace Law, supra note 11;

Obediencia Debida and Punto Final laws.
Obediencia Debida law, supra note 29; Punto

Final law, supra note 29; Press Release, Amnesty International, Colombia: Constitutional
Reform Undermines Human Rights (Dec. 11,2003), availableathttp://web.amnesty.org/library/
Index/ENGAMR230772003.
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expressly by the Argentine Congress to protect the military after the fall of the
junta differs only in form from the Colombian Congress's action making
prosecution and investigation of demobilizers prohibitively difficult.'62
Accordingly, Colombia's Constitutional Court was forced to intervene,
extending the time period available to investigators,' 63 which, distinct from the
situation in Argentina, some may see as thwarting the will of a freely-elected
Congress operating in no junta's shadow. While Argentine society has
progressed to a point of being able to view the actions of the junta as crimes
against humanity, the current Colombian administration does not yet seem
confident enough in its staying power to be able to meet the problem
directly."6 To be sure, Colombia has been facing low-intensity insurgencies
over a timeframe of decades, a phenomenon unknown to Argentina. However,
a piecemeal approach shielding human rights abusers from punishment makes
little sense in the region given the examples of Argentina, and to a lesser
extent, Peru, and the failures of El Salvador."65 At the same time, officials
have rejected the lessons of another country which also faced decades of
abuse.' 6 6 Therefore, it remains incumbent upon Colombia to come up with a
previously untested approach which must satisfy both domestic victims and
international observers. However, the Justice and Peace Law seems unlikely
to fulfill any of these requirements.
The Justice and Peace Law is likely to be challenged in an international
context for two reasons. 67 First, Colombia, like Argentina, has provided in its

162

While the Justice and Peace Law confers no express amnesty upon state actors, as did the

Argentine legislation, it originally placed strict limitations on prosecutors. See HUMAN RIGHTS
WATCH,

supra note 15.

See Human Rights Watch, supra note 33.
'" See ISACSON, supranote 25.
165 See Bomba del Tiempo, supra note 73.
'66
The Chairman ofthe Reparation and Reconciliation Commission, Eduardo Pizarro, refuses
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to consider the idea of "sensational public hearings," such as those in which offenders and
victims met face to face in South Africa. Rachel Van Dongen, Colombia Seeks Peace in the
Middle of War, CHRISTIAN SCI. MONITOR, Jan. 13, 2006.
167 On the domestic level, Colombia's Constitutional Court has utilized its power to strike
down certain provisions of the legislation. In January 2006, a Colombian citizen submitted to
a magistrate a petition calling for a ruling of the Law's unconstitutionality. The Constitutional
Court agreed to hear the case and made its decision in May 2006. La Proxima Semana Corte
ConstitucionalEstudiaraSuspension Temporal de Ley de Justiciay Paz, EL TIEMPO, Jan. 9,
2006, availableat http://eltiempo.terra.com.co/coar/NEGOCIACION/negociacion/ARTICULOWEB-_NOTAINTERIOR-2686579.html [hereinafter La ProximaSemana]. See also Human
Rights Watch, supra note 33.
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68
Constitution that international treaties take precedence over domestic law.
Therefore, Colombia must abide by the provisions of the Inter-American
Convention, including the enforcement of the right to a fair trial and the right
to judicial protection. 169 Second, as other South American countries, including
Argentina and Peru, abandon amnesty laws, Colombia most likely will
encounter greater pressure from abroad to repeal the Justice and Peace Law.
This pressure may also come from the Inter-American Court, whose decision
in BarriosAltos reflects a growing impatience with the impunity fostered by
amnesty laws and legislation closely modeled on amnesty provisions. 70
Ironically, incorporating international jurisprudence into the domestic
courts will likely prove to be reassuring for proponents of national sovereignty.
By relying on the BarriosAltos precedent prominently in their decision, the
justices of the Argentine Supreme Court spared the country the possible
humiliation of being forced to bow to international pressure. 7 ' With their own
national court solving the problem of amnesty, Argentines, unlike Colombians,
can be proud that the issue was resolved domestically, with no need for an
international court ruling, which may be characterized by some as foreign
meddling. Once the Colombian people become increasingly frustrated with the
results of the Justice and Peace Law, due both to a lack of foresight in drafting
and a general lack of resources, a ruling similar to BarriosAltos in the InterAmerican Court may well have to act as a catalyst for change in the country's
national reconciliation. As a fellow signatory of the American Convention on
Human Rights, Colombia is bound by the same obligations as Peru and
laws, may meet
Argentina.' 72 The Justice and Peace Law, like Peru's 17amnesty
3
Court.
Inter-American
the
of
hands
the
its demise at
Due to its shortcomings, the Justice and Peace Law appears to be an easy
target for a Colombian non-governmental organization with the wherewithal
to present a case to the Inter-American Court. 1 74 While the Justice and Peace

1991 (including amendments
through 2005) art. 93, availableat http://pdba.georgetown.edu/Constitutions/Colombia/col91.
html.
169 American Convention on Human Rights, supra note 116.
"0 BarriosAltos, supra note 20.
171 HectorSimon, supra note 14, para. 23 (opinion of Justice Petracchi).
172 American Convention on Human Rights, supranote 116. Colombiaratified the agreement
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on May 28, 1973, and recognized the obligatory competence of the Court on June 21, 1985. A
list of signatories and the dates of their accession is available at http://www.oas.org/juridico/
english/Sigs/b-32.html (last visited Oct. 24, 2006).
173 See La Proxima Semana, supra note 167.
114 Indeed, after being generally upheld by the ruling of Colombia's Constitutional Court, it
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Law never mentions the word "amnesty" itself, in Barrios Altos the InterAmerican Court focused on the incompatibility of the legislation with the
7 5 While proponents
Convention rather than on the form.Y
of the Colombian
law may argue that it is not "intended to prevent the investigation and
punishment of those responsible for serious human rights violations,"' 176 the
Justice and Peace Law, through its original sixty-day limit on a prosecutor's
decision to bring a case and its lenient sentences, begs the question of whether
Congress intended to focus on the protection of offenders and punishment of
victims. 177 The Constitutional Court struck down this provision, perhaps
imagining a situation in which Colombian prosecutors, hamstrung by
restrictive criminal procedure working to the defendant's advantage, lack not
just the monetary resources, but also the time required to uncover an offender's
serious human rights violations. In any case, Congress' original language
raises the question of whether the law was designed, and therefore "intended,"
to hinder investigation of such offenses. This would constitute a violation of
Article 1 and, by extension, Article 4 of the Convention. 178 Furthermore, the
lack of measures adopted to ensure that victims obtain legal protection and
enjoy the right to effective and simple recourse also works against Colombia
as a possible violation of Article 8 and Article 25.179 Colombians are
notoriously suspicious of the national police, making debatable the existence
of legal protection even in the most positive circumstances.' 81 Moreover, if
demobilizers are allowed to hide their assets through loopholes in the Law,
simple and effective recourse hardly seems readily available.' 8 ' All these

seemed that the peace process may be over. Paramilitary leaders reacted with furor at the
suggestion that paramilitary leaders sentenced before the commencement of negotiations with
the government would still have to serve their full sentences. However, a second interpretation
by court president Jaime C6rdoba assured leaders that even prior sentences would be suspended
if the demobilizers continued to comply with the peace agreement. Steven Dudley, Court's
Amnesty Dispute HurtingPeaceProspects, MIAMI HERALD, June 18, 2006, at 14A, available
at http://www.miami.com/mld/miami/herald/news/world/americas/14845375.htm.
' BarriosAltos, supra note 20, paras. 41-44.
176 Id. para. 41.
177Justice and PeaceLaw, supra note 11, arts. 17-21.
178 BarriosAltos, supra note 20, para.42. Article I of the American Convention on Human
Rights protects the rights and freedoms of all persons subject to the jurisdiction of the signatory
countries. American Convention on Human Rights, supranote 116.
179 American Convention on Human Rights, supra note 116.
180 See The Law of the Fraud,supra note 9.
181 See Colombia: Between Peace and Justice, supra note 23. However, after the
Constitutional Court's May 2006 decision, offenders must now pay full reparations to the
families of their victims. Juan Forero, Court Overrules Parts of Law Shielding Colombia's
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factors enhance the likelihood of a future ruling by the Inter-American Court
that the Law of Justice and Peace is no more than self-amnesty
legislation
s2
precisely of the sort discussed and rejected in BarriosAltos.
Barrios Altos contains the discussion of a number of Articles of the
American Convention on Human Rights. Specifically, the Court referred to
Articles 4, 5, 8, and 25 in its decision striking down the Peruvian amnesty
laws. 8 3 While the Justice and Peace Law operates in a manner dissimilar to
the Peruvian laws in form, in practice it is designed to bring about similar
results, therefore conflicting with the decision of the Inter-American Court and
traversing a path diametrically opposed to that taken by Argentina.
Article 25, the Right to Judicial Protection, was of particular significance
for the Argentine Supreme Court. s4 This Article specifically refers to the
possibility of the violation of fundamental rights by "persons acting in the
course of their official duties."'8 5 This clause directly linked the offenses in
Peru which gave rise to BarriosAltos with the crimes of the junta in the "Dirty
War." In both situations, security forces whose actions were
officially,
86
although secretly, authorized by the state, terrorized civilians.
While the Colombian paramilitaries, at least ostensibly, have never acted
officially as organs of the Colombian state, therefore eluding the scope of
Article 25, the Justice and Peace Law may still run afoul of this part of the
Convention. The Law does contain provisions that ensure a victim's rights
will be "determined by the competent authority provided for by the legal
system of the state"; 87 however, the ability and motivation of the Colombian
state to undertake "to ensure that the competent authorities shall enforce such
remedies when granted" are highly suspect.188 Events such as the government
dawdling for six months to issue regulations for the execution of the law, the
deaths of recent demobilizers, and the lack of funds for reparations may all
play a significant role in a determination that the Law is at odds with Article
25 of the Convention. 89 On the other hand, the Argentine Supreme Court's

Warlords, N.Y. TIMES, May 20, 2006, at A2.
182 BarriosAltos, supra note 20,para. 43.
183 Id. para. 39.
19 Hector Simon, supra note 14, para. 74 (opinion of Justice Maqueda).
' American Convention on Human Rights, supra note 116, art. 25.
186 See Nunca Mas, supra note 1; BarriosAltos, supra note 20, para. 2.
187 American Convention on Human Rights, supra note 116, art. 25.
188 Id.
'89 See Gobierno Reglamento la Ley de Justiciay Paz, supra note 76; Colombia: One and
a HalfSteps Forward,One Back, supranote 65.
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ruling in Hector Simon leaves no doubt that victims will continue to have their
day in court. 90
Article 5 of the Convention, Right to Humane Treatment, comes into play
as a guarantee against further abuse of the sort suffered by the Poblete family
or the victims of the Chengue massacre.' 9 ' While Argentina has taken steps
through its judiciary and state security forces to guard against further episodes
of "degrading punishment or treatment,"' ' and Colombia's Justice and Peace
Law certainly speaks the language of humane treatment, problems remain.
Beyond proscribing a spectrum of mistreatment ranging from torture to the
disrespect of a person's physical and mental integrity, Article 5 also prohibits
the punishment of any person other than the criminal.'9 3 While the Law
certainly contains no language memorializing a governmental directive to
prosecute the innocent, Colombians have nevertheless been subjected to a long
history of abuse from state security forces, including the police, who, as an arm
of the executive branch of government, will be tasked with the enforcement of
a Law lopsidedly lenient toward demobilizers who have terrorized villages. 94
Survivors who speak up may be singled out for further punishment.'9 5
Of course, much of the danger in such situations results less from
legislation than from factors such as the lack of control the Colombian state
exhibits over the provinces. 9' However, the Inter-American Court's ruling in
BarriosAltos focused on signatories' acceptance of a human rights strategy
based on "recognizing responsibilities" and "proposing integrated procedures
for attending to the victims based on three fundamental elements: the right to

190 After

the decision, officials anticipated that new cases would be tried; however, at that

time fiscal matters precluded large-scale government action. Larry Rohter, Argentine Ruling
Revives Cases of 'Dirty War' Victims, N.Y. TIMES, July 15, 2005, at A3. In fact, on August 24,
2006, after a six-week trial, an Argentine court sentenced Julio Hector Simon to twenty-five
years in prison for the torture and "illegal privation of liberty" of Jose Poblete and Gertrudis
Hlaczik. This was the first criminal sentence for human rights violations by a member of the
security forces since the repeal of the amnesty laws. PorSecuestrosy torturas, le dan 25 anos
de carcelal "Turco Julian," CLARIN, Aug. 5, 2006.
...See Nunca Mas, supra note 1; The Law of the Fraud,supra note 9.
192 American Convention on Human Rights, supra note 116, art. 5(2).
193Id. art. 5(3).
'9' The Law of the Fraud,supra note 9. Authorities detained and interrogated survivors of
the Chengue massacre who dared confront officials in a nearby town regarding the lack of a
teacher for the town's remaining children. Since Chengue remains "under guerrilla influence,"
the authorities continue to regard the locals with suspicion.
195 Id.
196

Id.
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truth, the right to justice and the right to obtain fair representation."'' 9 7 Unless
the state somehow inculcates the rural populace with a newfound trust in the
authorities, future cases in which Colombian victims are made to feel like
perpetrators of human rights offenses, and are not aided by the procedures
adopted in the Justice and Peace Law may well present the Inter-American
Court with an opportunity to rule that the Law has no legal effect due to a
substantive breach of Article 5.
Finally, Articles 8 and 25 of the Convention guarantee the right to the truth
and judicial representation, and Article 13 recognizes the right to seek and
receive information. 98 Here, the Justice and Peace Law, as written by
Congress, encounters grave self-imposed obstacles. The free confession
required by the law may amount to no more than a brusque recitation of the
demobilizer's name and his willingness to take advantage of the benefits of the
Law.'99 Ex-paramilitaries are not required to divulge the full extent of their
participation in past crimes, regardless of the level of atrocities committed.2 0
Prosecutors may ask for more details, but an intelligent offender will most
likely decline this invitation to self-incrimination, as is his right. This
seemingly official acceptance of a lack of information likely amounts to a
violation of Article 13 of the Convention, requiring the freedom to seek and
receive information.20 ' It therefore follows that a victim lacking enough
information to make use of his right to "simple and prompt recourse, 20 2 would
then have a cause of action for violation of Article 25. In BarriosAltos, the
Peruvian amnesty laws denied the surviving victims and the next of kin of the
deceased their rightful knowledge of the truth about the events that occurred
on that fateful day, a fact the Court relied upon in its ruling.2 3 Victims clearly
have the right to obtain clarification of the offenses which amounted to human
rights violations, and the state's responsibility to investigate remains beyond
question as well.
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98 American Convention on Human Rights, supra note 116.
'9 Justice and Peace Law, supra note 11, art. 17. The Constitutional Court's May 2006
ruling certainly strengthens the hand ofprosecutors, holding that demobilizers who hide the truth
will be tried under preexisting criminal law, and allowing victims to participate in all stages of
the criminal proceedings. See Human Rights Watch, supra note 33. However, it remains to be
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201 American Convention on Human Rights, supra note 116, art. 13.
202 Id. art. 25.
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In Colombia, since former combatants possess the right to keep secret all
but the most basic personal information, victims have little hope of pressing
the state to prosecute specific cases. 2°4 Furthermore, Colombia lacks the
institutionary breadth and depth which aided Argentines in uncovering
information about the crimes of the Dirty War. 2 5 This lack of information also
leads to a violation of Article 8 by denying a victim the right to a hearing to
determine his rights before a judge. °6 Such limited knowledge of past events
simply adds to the victim's trauma when attempting to pursue a case and must
also be addressed by the Colombian state in order to avoid the threat of the
Inter-American Court ruling against the Justice and Peace Law.
IX. CONCLUSION: ARGENTINA ON THE RIGHT PATH

While the Law of Justice and Peace purports to offer the procedural
safeguards and substantive power necessary to provide a catalyst for renewed
respect for the rule of law in Colombia, the Law most likely surrenders too
much to the ex-paramilitaries in the name of good will and reconciliation." 7
Victims will continue to suffer, while human rights offenders will escape with
little or no punishment for their crimes. 0 ' However, Colombia need only look
to the south for an example of successful reconciliation achieved through
domestic legislation and judicial proceedings. Argentina's legislative
renunciation of its amnesty laws set the stage for a slow, yet effective, judicial
examination of the past which will aid untold numbers of Argentines not only
in coming to terms with the actions of the military dictatorship, but also in
their trust of the state. Such trust appears to be diminishing in Colombia,
where the Justice and Peace Law's future as effective centerpiece legislation
remains, at best, questionable.20 9 Both international agreements and case
precedent contradict the likely effects of the Justice and Peace Law, making
a ruling of no legal effect by the Inter-American Court very possible.

2"4 Justice and Peace Law, supra note 11, para. 17.
205 No formal organization such as CONADEP has been set up by the Colombian authorities
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